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ABSTRACT 
 
The government of Hong Kong has a long history of providing public rental housing (PRH) to 
the low income groups in meeting their housing needs.  Even though the policy is in place to 
provide public housing to the needy, the accessibility of public housing in Hong Kong is 
becoming increasingly difficult.  In order to find out the reasons for the problem, the analysis of 
the nature of goods and services with reference to public housing is helpful in determining how 
the goods or services is delivered in the best way.   The government is the supplier of the public 
housing, whose policies have evolved from the ad-hoc approach in 1950s-1970s to 
incrementalism from 1980s onwards, developing through different actions to incentivise PRH 
tenants to vacate their flats.   In response, rational individuals who interact among themselves act 
in a way to maximise one’s benefits in order to become better off, leading to aggregate social 
phenomenon that is not intended by the government.   The sitting tenants of public rental housing 
and young educated applicants who have newly joined the waiting list of PRH are the evidence 
of the collective action problem, resulting in the situation of crowding out and inaccessibility of 
PRH.  In the conclusion, recommendations are made by drawing lessons from the case of 
Singapore for Hong Kong to take forward in future policy to increase the accessibility of PRH. 
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Chapter 1   Introduction 
 
Focus, Objectives and Background 
This project analyses how the government of Hong Kong has, over the past few decades, 
implemented policies and taken actions on public housing and how individuals have responded 
in different ways to maximise their utility, which exerted a direct effect on accessibility of public 
housing in Hong Kong.  Only accessibility of public rental housing is covered, excluding the 
subsidised home ownership which is also categorised as public housing in general terms.  The 
term “public housing” in this context is used interchangeably with “public rental housing (PRH)” 
bearing the same meaning unless it specifically mentions subsidised home ownership.  The 
project examines how the government delivers goods and services by controlling the housing 
supply.  Meanwhile the relationship between the government actions and how individuals react 
to result in a collective action to further generate the demand for public housing will also be one 
of the key areas for study.  The extent of accessibility to PRH is the outcome compounded by 
both the government policies and individuals’ collective actions.   
 
In Hong Kong, most people have four traditional major concerns in their daily lives, namely, 
clothing, food, housing and transport.  Among these, the issue of housing always tops the wish 
list of the general public to improve their living standard.  Hong Kong people work hard in order 
to save enough money to buy their own homes but it is not always easy as in other countries 
because the property price is always out of reach for most of the general public.  As a result, 
most of the housing units are small and people have to live in an overcrowding way.  Worse still, 
some even live in sub-standard housing like converted industrial buildings, sub-divided flats and 
cage homes.  As housing is considered as a fundamental human necessity to get shelter away 
from natural disasters, within limited public resources, it is obligatory that the government can 
provide cheap housing to those who cannot afford to rent or buy their own homes from the 
private market. 
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Hong Kong is a small city with a total area of 1,070 km2 and a 99-year history as a former 
British colony, developing from a “barren rock island” to a world-class financial centre in the 
last century.  As the economy of Hong Kong prospered, more and more people came to Hong 
Kong for settlement from the Mainland and all over the world.  The population rose 
tremendously from 3,650 in 1841 to 7.17 million in 2013.1   Land and property are scarce 
resources for which all people living in Hong Kong are competing at a high price.  According to 
the latest statistics provided by the Housing Authority, 29.1% of the population in Hong Kong 
are living in public rental housing, 17.1% are living in subsidised home ownership housing and 
the remainder, about half of them are living in private housing. 2  The demand for public housing 
has increasingly becoming more acute as evidenced by the skyrocketing property prices and the 
undesirable living conditions where around 171,000 people are still living in sub-divided flats in 
old buildings and at least half of them are on the waiting list for the public rental housing in 
Hong Kong.3  The waiting list for public rental housing has reached an unprecedented high level 
of 228,400 applicants as at March 2012, of which 111,500 are non-elderly singles who are not 
part of the government’s 3-year pledge of allotting them with the PRH units.   It is noteworthy 
that 60,300 of the singles are aged below 30.4  The current yearly average number of new units 
of PRH is only 15,000 which will be increased to 20,000 from 2018 onwards and the number of 
yearly recovered PRH units is only 7000.5  As the demand for PRH far exceeds the supply, it 
appears that the needy are encountering a great difficulty in accessing to the public housing in 
Hong Kong.  
 
                                                          
1 Sun, York Sui. The Evolution of Public Housing in Hong Kong. California State University. 1993. 
Census and Statistics Department, HKSAR Government. “Hong Kong Statistics Population.” Accessed 3 August 2013. 
2
 Hong Kong Housing Authority. “Housing in figures 2012.” Accessed 3 August 2013. 
http://www.housingauthority.gov.hk/en/common/pdf/about-us/publications-and-statistics/HIF.pdf 
3
 “Housing officials offer no solution to HK's subdivided flats problem.” South China Morning Post. 31 May 2013. 
4
 Ibid. 
5
 “Enforcement actions against abuse of public housing by Housing Department.” Oriental Daily. 11 February 2013.  
(In Chinese) 
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Research Questions and Related Propositions: Theory and Practice 
The project addresses the following research questions:  
• What policies are available to a government for fostering accessibility to public housing? 
• What policies on the accessibility of public housing have been adopted by the Hong 
Kong government? 
• What factors affect the level of accessibility of public housing in Hong Kong? 
• To what extent is public housing actually accessible to the public in Hong Kong? 
• Drawing on relevant experience in Singapore, what other policies might be adopted by 
the Hong Kong government to increase the accessibility of public housing in the future? 
 
In delivery of public goods and services to the target groups, the government regulates the access 
to and consumption of public housing through the application of eligibility criteria and imposing 
rules on continuous occupancy to ensure that those in greatest need can readily access to the 
public housing.  By building on the traditional ad-hoc approach of meeting the housing needs at 
different junctures of time and under the prevailing economic, social and political situation, the 
government enacts small policy changes over time through an incrementalist approach in order 
to maintain the stable supply of public housing.  In response to the government policies, the 
rational individuals, especially those existing PRH tenants, counteract against the effect of the 
government policies and maximise their benefits and utility to continue living in the PRH units 
by buying their own flats under Tenants Purchase Scheme (TPS), paying higher rents if the 
household incomes exceed the designated level, or evading government enforcement actions to 
recover their PRH units.  Although the Hong Kong government has all along been regulating the 
rational demand of individuals, the public housing is still considered not easily accessible by the 
general public in recent years.  
 
From the historical perspective, Singapore started off the public housing policy in 1960 with the 
aim of providing affordable housing to the needy against a similar social and political 
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background as in Hong Kong.   Having gained experience over almost half a century in running 
public housing policy, Singapore has successfully made public housing accessible to the public, 
amounting to 83% of the total population.  On examining the key features of Singaporean public 
housing policy, such as affordable ownership, promotion of public housing market mechanism, 
commitment in achieving policy targets, flexible land supply policy and unified and integrated 
planning and coordination of public housing policy, there may be takeaway lessons for Hong 
Kong to consider in its future policy and action. 
 
Overview of the Analytical Framework  
The analysis of the nature of the goods and services is helpful in understanding the role of the 
government in provision of public housing and the way to incentivise individuals so that the 
huge demand for public housing arising from collective actions can be controlled.   In this regard, 
the issue of accessibility to PRH in Hong Kong determines who should get heavily subsidised 
housing benefits.  Unlike other countries where land resources are adequate, the housing problem 
of Hong Kong lies on the disproportionate population growth as well as insufficient land and 
housing sources.  The government does not have the capacity to provide each and every single   
Hong Kong resident with a subsidised housing unit.  The market accounted for slightly more 
than half of the provision of housing in Hong Kong.  
 
The analytical framework established in Chapter Two addresses the role of the government in the 
delivery of goods and services.  The nature of goods and services is a key basis for understanding 
the issue of accessibility of PRH.  Collective action issues address how individuals respond to 
government policies and action to maximise their utility.  The incrementalist approach advocated 
by Charles Lindblom6, which refers to the method of change by which small policy changes are 
enacted over time in order to create a larger broad base policy change, assists in analysing how 
the government makes policy and takes action on public housing in response to the delivery of 
                                                          
6
 Lindblom, Charles E. The Science of “Muddling Through”. Public Administration Review 19(2) pp. 79-88, 1959. 
Wiley. 
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goods and services as well as demand from rational individuals.  The factors considered in the 
framework serve to structure, guide and inform the empirical analysis in subsequent chapters.  
 
Research Methodology 
The empirical analysis of this project is primarily a desktop research based on data and 
information released by the HKSAR government, particularly the Housing Authority.  Policy 
addresses by the Chief Executive of the HKSAR government and views from the Long Term 
Housing Strategy Steering Committee, professionals and academics in the field are also reviewed 
and referred to, together with sources from newspapers and magazines.  Perspectives of the 
HKSAR government and housing-related institutions of Hong Kong are considered and 
compared with perspectives of the Singapore government.  These are coupled with appropriate 
and relevant literature review, observations and non-research analysis. 
 
 
This project adopts a desktop approach to study the government policies and actions in public 
housing since the study involves an examination and review on relevant government policies and 
actions which are stated in policy papers.  Policy documents from housing organisations and 
public speeches of officials also constitute the understanding of the relevant government policies 
and actions.  In studying the demand from rational individuals, the government statistics on 
public housing, reports from newspapers and magazines and observations provide a window for 
insight and analysis.  For the analytical framework involving the nature of goods and services 
and the incrementalist approach, literature review is used as a foundation of understanding. 
 
Chapter Outline 
This report is structured in five chapters, including this introductory chapter. Chapter Two 
establishes the analytical framework for the project by introducing the types of goods and 
services, government policy and action in relation to the delivery of goods and services, 
collective action issues arising from rational demand of self interested individuals and how the 
government responds to such issues through the incrementalist approach.  It also sets out the 
scope and issues of public services in general by bringing out the issue of accessibility and the 
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accessibility barriers to public goods and services.  This is followed by Chapter Three which 
details the development of public housing policy and action in Hong Kong from early colonial 
times to 2012, as well as the functions of public bodies in formulating and implementing public 
housing policies in Hong Kong.  Chapter Four then provides a thorough analysis of the issue of 
accessibility of public housing by applying the analytical framework of goods and services, 
collective action and incrementalism.  In Chapter Five, the findings of the report are concluded, 
drawing on the public housing policies in Singapore as a basis for lessons of relevance to future 
policies in Hong Kong.  
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Chapter Two  Analytical Framework: The Role of Government in 
the Delivery of Goods and Services 
 
Introduction 
In this project, the nature of goods and services is addressed as a key basis for understanding the 
issue of accessibility of PRH through an analysis of how the government makes policies and 
takes actions on public housing and how individuals respond to government policies and action 
to maximise their utility.  A set of lenses is developed through which to describe and assess the 
Hong Kong public housing experience in subsequent chapters.  The focus is on types of goods 
and services, government action in relation to the delivery of these goods and services, and how 
individuals respond to such government policies and actions.  While the government responds to 
the delivery of goods and services by regulating access through the incrementalist approach, it 
also has to respond to collective action issues in the demand side where rational individuals tend 
to take actions that maximise their self interest and in return, push up the demand for public 
services and overwhelm the effect of government policy and action. 
 
Goods and Services: Types, Accessibility and Ongoing Availability 
 
A four-way classification 
Goods and services can be classified into four types: public goods, toll goods, common pool 
goods and private goods.   A public goods is one that is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
restrict someone’s access to it and it is available for subsequent consumption or use by someone 
else.  Air is an example of public goods.  A toll goods is one that is possible to restrict someone’s 
access to it and it is available for subsequent consumption or use by someone else.  A bus is an 
example of toll goods.  A common pool goods is one that is very difficult, if not impossible, to 
restrict someone’s access to it and it is unavailable for subsequent consumption or use by 
someone else.  A fish in the sea is an example of common pool goods.  A private goods is one 
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that is possible to restrict someone’s access to it and it is unavailable for subsequent consumption 
or use by someone else. Electricity is an example of private goods.   Figure 1 provides a matrix 
of types of goods and services for understanding of the nature of goods and services against two 
features of jointness of use and exclusiveness.   Exclusion and jointness of use or consumption 
can be viewed as two defining characteristics in distinguishing between private and public goods. 
Jointness of consumption exists when consumption of a goods or service by one person does not 
preclude its use or consumption by another person, meaning that consumption is non-subtractible, 
and vice versa.  Exclusion occurs when potential users can be denied consumption of goods or 
services unless they meet certain terms and conditions.  Where exclusion is infeasible, anyone 
can derive benefits from the goods or service, and vice versa.  
 
Figure 1: Types of Goods 
      Alternative Use       Joint Use 
Private Goods Toll Goods 
Common Pool Goods Public Goods 
 
Source: Ostrom and Ostrom (1977). 
 
Barriers to accessibility 
Even though a public goods or service is available for consumption, it can also be easily 
inaccessible to the public due to various barriers such as the physical barrier, information or 
cognition barrier, psychological barrier and crowding out. These barriers may arise from changes 
in circumstances over time.  They are discussed in turn in the ensuing paragraphs. 
(a) Physical barrier. Mismatch of geographical locations of the services provided and the people 
requiring the services and lack of convenient transportation are examples showing how people’s 
access to the public services are denied.  Failure in master planning attributes to the problem of 
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mismatch and increases the physical barrier. For example, health clinics located in remote and 
sparsely populated areas often record suboptimal usage rate due to physical barrier while health 
clinics located in more convenient areas are often over-subscribed and patients in need are 
crowded out. 
(b) Information or cognition barrier. Lack of information about a public service denies people 
from access to it as people are not aware of the existence of such a service or how it is 
meaningful to their needs.  For example, the elderly do not readily avail themselves to the access 
to public services because of the information barrier as they are often unaware of the public 
services available to them and the means to obtain information due to insufficient knowledge and 
limited access to information channels as nowadays most public information are announced 
through electronic means and internet.  The cognition barrier exists when people have negative 
attitudes or beliefs on public services.  For example, many Hong Kong people are frustrated in 
the government’s lack of determination and capability in solving problem of housing shortage.  
People are deterred by the complicated procedures and the multiple layers of bureaucracy  
through which they obtain public housing.   As a result, many resort to finding accommodation 
in the private market instead of applying for public housing. 
(c) Psychological barrier. Psychological barrier arising from stereotype, social stigma and 
negative image associated with certain public services denies access.  For example, the 
Comprehensive Social Security Allowance (CSSA) is associated with a negative image of being 
unproductive.  Many poor people refrain themselves from applying for it even they do have a 
genuine need since they do not want themselves to be portrayed as a social burden.   For example, 
some people would even take up two labour intensive jobs at the same time in order to get 
sufficient income to feed the family instead of applying for CSSA.  They do not want to transpire 
that they live on social welfare and prevent the younger generation from discrimination.  In this 
way, access is denied as people do not wish to be labeled through obtaining a certain public 
service. 
(d) Barrier due to crowding out.  Limited supply not satisfying the total demand crowds people 
out from the queue to public services and deny their access.  Long waiting time and harsh 
eligibility criteria arising from limited supply pose a barrier to people’s access to public services.  
For example, people who are examined to be eligible for public housing and registered on the 
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public housing waiting list are crowded out from the public housing service as they would still 
have to wait for at least 3 years before being given an offer.  As housing is a necessity that 
requires immediate consumption, many of these waiting people resort to subdivided flats or even 
cage homes in the private market as they do not have any other options. 
 
Collective Action: Demand for Public Goods and Services 
People react differently in response to government policy, some comply with it but some react 
inconsistent with the policy target.  Some also react with reference to how other individuals 
respond to the government within the same group.   Rational individuals are considered to be 
self-interested choosing the best alternative available to them in order to maximise their benefits.  
Most individuals think that they can take the maximum benefit without having regard to others’ 
interests or being noticed as the group is large enough to accommodate their own needs.   
Therefore, all rational individuals can lead to irrational aggregate outcomes that are not intended 
or desired by the policy maker, attributing to the collective action problem.7   In this sense, if the 
government policy and action are conceptualized as the supply of goods and services, the 
collective action issues can push up the demand for public services and overwhelm the effect of 
government policy and action.  
 
Sometimes collective action problems arise when out-numbered rational self-interested 
individuals clot the access and hence paralyse the continual availability of public services.  For 
instance, there has been overwhelming demand for emergency hospital service as those patients 
with less urgent situations choose to go to public hospitals to receive medical service.  People 
think it is cheap and the medical service is believed to be of higher quality due to its better 
equipment, together with the limited supply of such services, crowds out those who are waiting 
in line for access to the service.  The services could not be delivered in time for subsequent 
consumption or use by someone else. 
                                                          
7
 Bickers, Kenneth N., and John T. Williams. Public Policy Analysis: A Political Economy Approach. Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Co. 2001.   
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Government Responses to Goods, Services and Collective Action 
Public service is a toll goods that is possible to restrict someone’s access to it and it is available 
for subsequent consumption or use by someone else. In other words, the jointness of use exists 
and it is also feasible to exclude someone from it by applying some terms and conditions.  In the 
delivery of public goods and services, government policies and actions are required to maintain 
the supply and meanwhile to control the supply by restricting someone’s access to its goods and 
services so that public resources are available for subsequent consumption or use by someone 
else in the society.  For examples, healthcare, education, housing and social welfare are public 
services categorised as toll goods.  The government can set the conditions upon which the 
public’s access to its services is available and leave room for future or other users’ consumption.  
 
However, rational individuals tend to maximise their self-interests, resulting in collective action 
problem which can hugely boost the demand for public goods and services and overwhelm the 
effect of government policy and action. For instance, the free-riding behaviour of sitting tenants 
of PRH leads to the minimal 7,000 flats recovered for re-allocation each year, which is against 
228,400 applicants on the waiting list as at March 2013.  In the case of the sitting tenants, the 
PRH flats they occupy are turned from toll goods to private goods, which become unavailable for 
subsequent consumption or use by someone else.  This greatly undermines the government’s 
policies and actions in increasing supply of PRH flats for needy individuals on the waiting list. 
 
In response to the collective action issues stated in the above paragraphs, the government is 
required to maintain the supply of public goods and services as toll goods and keep them from 
turning into private goods due to the overwhelming demand from the self interested individuals. 
The government regulates access to and consumption of these public services through the 
implementation of policies for consumption by means of eligibility criteria and user charges so 
that they are available for subsequent consumption or use by the general public.  For example, 
the Hospital Authority applies the Triage System in the Accident and Emergency Departments of 
all its hospitals to sort patients into priority categories to ensure treatment is given to patients on 
the basis of the severity of their conditions.  Triage I critical cases are given immediate treatment; 
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Triage II emergency cases are treated within 15 minutes; and Triage III urgent cases are treated 
within 30 minutes.  Patients are also required to pay a fee for the use of service.8  Patients might 
therefore consider whether it is absolutely necessary to use the Accident and Emergency service 
and whether they could otherwise visit a private clinic or hospital for their particular cases.  In 
this way, the Hospital Authority regulates the accessibility to its Accident and Emergency 
service and ensures subsequent consumption or use is available by patients in need. 
 
Even though a public goods or service is available for consumption, it can also become 
inaccessible to the public due to various barriers such as the physical barrier, information or 
cognition barrier, psychological barrier and crowding out as discussed earlier in this chapter. 
These barriers may arise from changes in circumstances over time.  These accessibility barriers, 
together with the collective action issues, necessitate corresponding government policies and 
actions. 
 
In response to the collective action issues and accessibility barriers, the government may adopt 
an incrementalist approach in addressing the accessibility issue by gradually modifying policies.  
As advocated by Charles Lindblom9 , incrementalism in public administration refers to the 
method of change by which small policy changes are enacted over time in order to create a larger 
broad base policy change.  A series of small steps are taken towards an agenda. For example, the 
Hong Kong government has incrementally increased the scale of port facilities, build more 
hospitals and build more schools to cope with the increasing demand so as to maintain the 
accessibility to these public services.   In the social welfare aspect, the Hong Kong government is 
reluctant to take bold steps such as introducing a “universal retirement protection scheme”. 
Instead, the line of the government is to take smaller steps in strengthening and improving the 
                                                          
8
 Hong Kong Hospital Authority. “Guide to Accident & Emergency (A&E) Service.”  Accessed 11 August 2013  
http://www.ha.org.hk/visitor/ha_visitor_index.asp?Content_ID=10051&Lang=ENG&Dimension=100&Parent_ID=1
0042&Ver=HTML 
9
 Lindblom, Charles E. The Science of “Muddling Through”. Public Administration Review 19(2) pp. 79-88, 1959. 
Wiley. 
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existing retirement protection system that consists of the non-contributory social security system, 
the Mandatory Provident Fund system and voluntary private savings.  
 
Other than muddling through by enacting small policy changes over time to create a larger broad 
base policy change, the government can also introduce targeted policies and radical changes to 
address the issue. Sometimes, in response to emergency situations like natural disasters, 
accidents or incidents with great social impact, the government would introduce radical changes 
in its policies to maintain accessibility to certain public services.  Targeted policies are enforced 
to address specific issues.  For instance, in the wake of the shortage of obstetrics services for 
Hong Kong mothers due to the influx of mainland pregnant women giving births in Hong Kong, 
the Hong Kong government banned mainland women from giving birth in private and public 
hospitals.  The accessibility of Hong Kong women to obstetrics services was thus addressed by 
such radical change in policy. 
 
Concluding Comments 
The nature of goods and services is analysed as a key basis for understanding the issue of 
accessibility of public goods and services through an analysis of how the government makes 
policy and takes action on the delivery of public goods and services and how rational 
individuals respond to government policy and action to maximise their utility.  The key 
elements of the framework, namely types of goods and services, government policy and action 
in relation to the delivery of these goods and services, and collective action issues are 
introduced. While the government makes policy and takes action for the delivery of goods and 
services, collective action problems arise when rational individuals tend to take actions that 
maximise their self-interests and as a result push up the demand for public services.  Coupled 
with certain accessibility barriers, they overwhelm the effect of government policies and actions. 
In response, the government may enact small policy changes over time by the incrementalist 
approach or introduce targeted and radical changes. The next chapter discusses specifically the 
Hong Kong government’s policy and action from 1940s onwards in the delivery of public 
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housing as a toll goods and how its policy and action have responded to collective action issues 
as well as accessibility barriers intensify over the time. 
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Chapter Three    Hong Kong Housing Policy and Action in Phases 
 
Introduction 
For the past 50 years, the Hong Kong government implemented different housing policies 
and took various actions to meet the need of the citizens.  There were long term planning as 
well as short term measures in the light of different social crises and phenomena.   In general, 
the goal of the government was to provide shelter to the needy at the initial stage.  With the 
growth of the economy, there was change in the aspirations of the people.  The general 
expectation rose from public rental housing provision to home ownership.  This led to the 
change in government policies and introduction of various housing schemes. 
 
In the ensuing paragraphs, the development of public housing is divided into six progressive 
stages.  The policies and actions in each stage are discussed individually in accordance with 
the evolving social, economic and political environment during that particular period.  
Besides, the prominent organisations engaged in housing, either public or government 
subsidised, are introduced to give a complete picture on how the public housing started to 
take shape. 
 
Stages in Public Housing Development 
 
Stage I (before 1954) 
The housing policies and issues are closely connected with the population figures.  In the 
early colonial days, British government developed Hong Kong as a window and distribution 
centre to facilitate British trade with China.  A great portion of the people living in Hong 
Kong during those periods were mobile and unsettled, as people just came to Hong Kong for 
trading purposes, looking for jobs or simply seeking refuge away from war.   During the 
wartime and baby boom after World War II from 1940s’ onwards, there has been a quick 
population growth driven by the massive influx of immigrants from China and natural births.  
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By 1950 when the political turmoil in China and World War II had ended, the population has 
grown to the level of around 2.3 million.10 
 
The private housing market in Hong Kong during the early colonial days in 1950s could not 
meet the acute demands for housing.  With limited skills and technology, only Chinese 
tenement houses were available to provide the living space for general public.   Most of the 
tenement houses were only three to four storeys high, in which most units were sub-divided 
and occupied by a number of households with shared communal facilities such as kitchen and 
toilet.  In those days, overcrowding was prevalent as the economic development was not 
good.  People could not afford renting an individual apartment for their families as they were 
mostly low-salaried workers.  New immigrants from China resorted to living with their 
relatives and friends despite their poor living condition, making the environment even more 
crowded.   
 
The colonial government did not play an active role in providing public housing to the needy.  
First of all, because of the political philosophy of laissez-faire advocating “Positive non-
interventionism” and “Big market small government”, the government was commissioned to 
make a balanced spreadsheet within the society of Hong Kong and thus, they were bounded 
not to apply for funding from the British government.  Without financial income of other 
sources, providing massive number of public housing would not be economically and 
politically feasible.  On the other hand, due to the mobility of the population of Hong Kong 
starting from 1940s onwards, the government perceived that the population boom and the 
subsequent housing shortage was temporary in nature and did not act swiftly to solve the 
housing shortage. 11 
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Stage II (1954 – 1972) 
 
In December 1953, a major fire in Shek Kip Mei destroyed the homes of some 53,000 
squatter residents.  Coupled with the soaring number of refugee migrants from the Mainland, 
the Hong Kong government recognised the imminent need to provide shelter for the people.  
As most of them were either refugees or the grassroots, the target was to provide affordable 
homes for these low-income groups.  The immediate actions were to launch large scale 
housing programme.  The ‘multi-storey buildings’ (or the ‘resettlement blocks’) were first 
introduced to house the displaced fire victims and other people affected by squatter clearance.  
Each family was allocated a unit of 120 square feet, based on the standard of 24 square feet 
per adult. The facilities, though primitive in nature with communal washrooms, laundry 
space, cooking space and toilets on each floor, 12 could basically satisfy the housing demand 
of the public in those days.  This also marked the beginning of the formal public housing 
policy of the Hong Kong government.  
 
In the course of resettling the homeless people arising from the fire, an emergency 
subcommittee of the Urban Council was set up to conduct the relief work.  The subcommittee 
proposed to the government to build multi-storey buildings to house the fire victims.  As the 
squatter problems had come into light after the Shek Kip Mei Fire as well as the vacating the 
urban lands for industrial and economic development, a new Resettlement Department was 
created in 1954 to take charge of clearing up and resettling the squatters. 13   Since the 
establishment of the resettlement programmes, there have been more than 1,150,000 living in 
the resettlement blocks between 1954 and 1972, accounting for 28% of the total population 
of Hong Kong by that time. 14   We can see that the resettlement of squatters has 
fundamentally shaped the provision of public housing in Hong Kong government which has 
greatly improved the livelihood of the general public in Hong Kong.  The colonial 
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government has since then taken a great and important part in supplying its citizens the 
housing in Hong Kong. 
 
In 1972, the new Governor, Sir Murray MacLehose, launched the Ten-Year Housing Plan to 
tackle the slum and squatter problem, as well as the housing plight in resettlement estates.  
The target was to re-house 1.8 million people in permanent, self-contained public rental 
housing.  The project was scheduled for completion within ten years.15   
 
Stage III (1973 – 1979) 
 
Under the influence of widespread social riots in 1966-67, the government started a radical 
review on its housing policies.  The poor living conditions had made people growing strong 
sentiments and opposition against the government for their inaction on the hardship of their 
people.  Taking this opportunity, the political force from the mainland China in the name of 
nationalism stirred up the mob to rock the colonial government by pointing at their poor 
administration and a lot of young people aired their grievances in poor living conditions and 
lack of social services.  Thus the policy objective of this stage was to raise the housing 
production target, both in quantity and quality.  Besides, the construction of public estates 
would increase employment opportunity and stimulate consumption,16 bringing benefits to 
the economy.   The Ten-Year Housing Program was originally targeted to house 1.5 million 
people and to eliminate all the squatters around Hong Kong.  Even though the government 
could not completely meet its goal, a total of 220,000 PRH flats were built during the period 
from 1973 to 1982.17  
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With the government playing an active role in the provision of public housing to the people, 
there was the need to acquire land resources from different possible means.  Apart from the 
land scarcity in Hong Kong, the problem was that most of the land in the urban area had been 
fully used as commercial business centre.  The setting up of new towns, based on the concept 
of ‘satellite town’ in the United Kingdom, became the major source of land supply.  The 
Tsuen Wan New Town, the Shatin New Town and the Tuen Mun New Town were identified.  
Slope-cutting and reclamation were major ways to get new lands for development.  Apart 
from the provision of residential districts, there were also commercial, industrial and 
recreational areas to meet the needs of the people within the new town.   The Oi Man Estate 
was built in 1975 under the concept of ‘a little town within a city’.  In general, the 
government aimed at improving the quality of public rental housing and the idea of home 
ownership was still in its infancy at this stage. 
 
Stage IV (1980 – 1996) 
 
This stage was characterised by rapid economic growth as well as the upsurge in the 
population of the city.   Both the population and economic boom led to the strong demand for 
home ownership.  In 1978, the government launched the first batch of public housing in the 
Home Ownership Scheme (HOS) to meet the demand of the people.  It allowed the occupants 
of the PRH to purchase publicly subsidised apartment from the government.  Subsidised-sale 
public housing estates were built for the low-income residents.  HOS bore a special meaning 
in terms of the accessibility of public housing.  Those public housing residents who became 
home owners had to surrender the PRH units to the government for subsequent allocation to 
other people on the waiting list, thus the recovery of PRH units increases the accessibility of 
other people.  It could also shorten the waiting list for PRH as some eligible buyers might 
acquire subsidised flat direct without such allocation.    
 
In view of the anticipated change of sovereignty in 1997, there was a major policy review in 
mid-1980s and home ownership was considered as a tool to foster a sense of belonging and 
increase social stability.  The government further made good use of the market force to 
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enhance home ownership through various loan schemes.  In gist, there was a general shift of 
the housing policy from public rental housing to home ownership. 
 
Under HOS, there is clear re-sale mechanism.  The second-hand market is restricted to 
eligible low-income residents.  Alternatively, the owner had to re-pay the land cost which 
was subsidised by the government if the flat is sold in the open market.  In this sense, the 
accessibility of the public rental housing would not be adversely affected. 
 
Throughout this stage, the Hong Kong people experienced a surge in home prices.  The value 
of private property had gone out of reach for the general public.  The HOS was introduced to 
bridge the gap between public rental housing.  To alleviate the problem of land scarcity, the 
government increased the development of new town in massive scale.  In addition to the 
Tsuen Wan, Shatin and Tuen Mun new towns which started as early as 1950s, the virgin 
development of reclaimed fishponds and wetland in Tin Shui Wai was conceived, in order to 
house more than 140,000 residents on the 240 hectares of land in 1987.   
 
Stage V (1997 – 2002) 
 
With the change of sovereignty in 1997, the newly established HKSAR government pledged 
to solve the overwhelming problem of housing affordability.  The three major policy 
objectives announced by the then Chief Executive C. H. Tung included (i) to expand the 
overall housing production to 85,000 units a year; (ii) to shorten the waiting time in the 
General Waiting List of the PRH; and (iii) to provide affordable homes for those low income 
groups.  These goals were particularly appealing to the pubic as the property price reached its 
historical climax, reviving their hope of home purchase through the assistance of the 
government. 
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To meet the acute need of housing from the public, the Tenant Purchase Scheme (TPS) was 
introduced in 1997.  It involved the selling of selected government-built public housing 
estates at price well below the market level.    By providing an opportunity for sitting tenants 
to buy the housing units being occupied at a very affordable price, the TPS provided tenants 
with the first step in the home ownership ladder so that they could begin to move up to better 
housing.18   Basically, there were fewer procedural requirements as the targeted groups were 
already the clientele of the public housing and therefore not many eligibility criteria have to 
be met such as the maximum household income.  Indeed, the advantage for this scheme was 
that the government “sold-off” the maintenance and management costs of the public housing 
to the existing tenants and therefore the financial burden of heavy subsidisation was shifted 
to the users.   Nevertheless, it was criticised that “the offer of deep discounts available for 
sitting tenants to buy their own fats – whose quality has been steadily improved over the past 
few years comparable to HOS housing – effectively lured public housing tenants to stay in 
public housing even though they can afford to buy HOS or private housing”19 and hence the 
accessibility of PRH had been greatly undermined due to decrease in the number of the 
recovered flats surrendered by the existing tenants. 
 
The policy of selling public rental housing flats to the tenants, from a different perspective, 
bore a direct impact on turning public housing from toll goods to private goods.  As the 
measure had actually made the tenants to permanently live in their existing housing units, 
public housing was then turned into both excludable and rivalrous.  From the viewpoint of 
impartiality, it could be regarded as a measure tolerating the ineffective use of resources.  
Those who had an acute public housing need might have to wait for a longer period because 
of the policy implementation.   
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Not only did the regional financial crisis in 1998 lead to a rapid downslide of the property 
value in Hong Kong, but also brought a drastic change in the housing policy.  The withering 
of the property market was closely related to the bust of the economy.  In the first place, the 
yearly target of 85,000 housing units was abandoned.  In 2002, the government announced 
the suspension of the HOS and the other subsidised home ownership schemes.  It further 
stopped all scheduled land auctions, and the supply of new land would only be triggered from 
the Application List initiated by the property developers. 20   The rationale behind was 
simple – the government did not want to see further shrinking of the property value which 
might undermine the already feeble economy.  All these measures aimed at stabilising and 
boosting the property market. 
 
Stage VI (2003 – present) 
 
The outbreak of SARS epidemic in 2003 gave another heavy blow to the Hong Kong 
economy as well as the property market.  In the same year, the waiting time of PRH was 
around 2 years, which was the shortest for the past decade.  The economy took a few years to 
revive, and so was the private property market.  The private sector’s failure to produce 
affordable housing could be regarded as a ‘market failure’ justifying government 
intervention.21  With the devaluation of the private properties, it left room for the government 
to expand its policies of assisting the public in home ownership at a relative low cost.  
 
From 2007 onwards, the property market was on an unprecedented rising trend again, 
causing the property value to reach another historical climax in 2012.  Similar to the situation 
faced by the his predecessor and his government in 1997, the Chief Executive C.Y. Leung 
targeted to shorten the waiting time for public rental housing and to provide affordable 
homes for the Hong Kong people who are in need.   To meet the policy goals, the re-launch 
of the Home Ownership Scheme was announced.  Besides, the government would actively 
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increase the scale of public rental housing provision.  The housing production target will 
further increase to 25,000 starting from 2018 when the government planned to build an 
average of about 20,000 PRH flats and 5,000 HOS flats each year in support of the Chief 
Executive's commitment to increase the overall production of housing.22 
 
Major Organisations Engaged in Housing 
 
Hong Kong Housing Society 
There are various organizations engaged in public housing in Hong Kong.  Early history can 
be dated back to the year 1948 with the establishment of the Hong Kong Housing Society 
which is still in operation nowadays.  It is an independent and not-for-profit organisation 
incorporated by ordinance in 1951.  Providing complementary housing through a number of 
its own innovative schemes and as a partner of the government, the Housing Society builds 
self-contained homes for the people in need at non-prohibitive rates.  It aims to meet niche 
markets and fill the gap between private market and the government.  The first of its rental 
housing estate “Sheung Li Uk” was completed in 1952 to provide low-rental housing for the 
grass root families.  At present, the Housing Society runs 20 rental housing estates providing 
around 32,000 units.  The latest activity includes the selling of ‘Heya Green’ in 2012 which 
was its first urban redevelopment project. 
 
Hong Kong Housing Authority and Housing Department 
The Hong Kong Housing Authority (HA) is a statutory body established in April 1973 under 
the Housing Ordinance.  The HA develops and implements a public housing programme 
which seeks to achieve the Government's policy objective of meeting the housing needs of 
people who cannot afford private rental housing.  The Housing Department (HD) is the 
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executive arm of the HA.23  Policies regarding PRH in Hong Kong are formulated by HA 
whereas the HD is responsible for executing the policies.   
 
Transport and Housing Bureau 
Currently housing policies in Hong Kong is placed under the purview of the Transport and 
Housing Bureau, headed by Professor Anthony Cheung Bing-leung who also assumes the 
office of Chairman of the Housing Authority.  The bureau aims at striking a fine balance 
between a healthy development of the private residential property market on the one hand as 
well as the provision of subsidised housing to those in need on the other.  For subsidised 
housing, it is the target of the government to provide an adequate supply of public rental 
housing to maintain an average waiting time of three years.  For those middle class who 
cannot afford to acquire a private residential property, the government is also prepared to 
assist them along in the housing ladder through the re-launch of the Home Ownership 
Scheme. 
 
Concluding Comments 
For the past century, Hong Kong has successfully transformed itself from a small and rural 
fishing port to an international financial centre.  No doubt, the property market played a 
significant role in the economy boom.  Not only did it help generate revenue for the 
government, its citizens also benefited from the surge in property value.  The wealth inflation 
effect through the creation of an affluent class adds momentum to the economic growth.  Yet 
the property market is closely linked to the housing need – a basic necessity of every 
individual.  The surge in property market value has made home ownership out of reach for 
both the middle class and grass root people.  The government should have a major part to 
play in enhancing the accessibility of housing to its people. 
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While the Hong Kong government is determined to help those who cannot afford to buy or 
rent private housing, the actions and policies implemented largely hinged on the prevailing 
property market in different stages.  In general, there is a gradual progression in the provision 
of public housing – from the ‘resettlement blocks’ to self-contained apartments and from 
rental housing to home ownership.  However, the government has placed the economic 
growth ahead of its commitment to meet the housing requirement of the needy.  The 
introduction of the HOS in 1978, its suspension in 2002 and the recent re-launch reflect that 
the government does not have a thorough plan to tackle the housing problem in Hong Kong.  
The officials only solve the imminent housing problems in an ad-hoc approach without 
regard to the systemic housing mechanism.  On the one hand, the policy of the government 
tends to muddle through in light of the property market value, land supply, economic 
situation and the demand from the people.  On the other hand, the general public tries to 
interpret the policy and take appropriate acts with a view to maximising the benefit from the 
property market. 
 
In the next chapter, we shall look into the housing policy and actions of the government 
under the analytical framework of incrementalism, in the sense that long-term and strategic 
housing plans are yet to be seen.  At the same time, the reaction of the people leads to 
collective action which poses further barrier to the problem of accessibility to housing.  
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Chapter Four    A Critique of Housing Policy and Action: 
Problems of Accessibility, Incrementalism and 
Collective Action 
 
Introduction 
In recent years, as evidenced by the long waiting list for PRH and there remained a large 
group of Hong Kong people not being properly housed but living in sub-divided flats and 
cage homes, it is obvious that there are some problems of accessibility to PRH.  As a result, 
people of imminent housing needs are barred from acquiring PRH flats provided by the 
government.  In this Chapter, the main barriers to accessibility are analysed through the lens 
of the government incrementalist housing policies and collective action of the individuals.   
Over the past few decades, Hong Kong government has taken up the responsibility of 
providing affordable housing units to the low income group who cannot fulfill their housing 
needs by themselves.  The housing policies have evolved in a way to add on small changes to 
the existing ones, making incremental shift from the status quo, influenced by the traditional 
laissez faire political philosophy.  Through adopting this approach, the public housing 
policies are considered unable to meet the desirable outcome of what ought to be, that is to 
realistically address the housing needs of those who actually cannot secure housing by their 
own means.  In order to cope with the policies, the self-interested individuals would react to 
maximise their own benefits that may depart from or counteract the policy aims, exacerbating 
the problem of accessibility to PRH.  
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The Main Barriers to Accessibility to Housing 
 
Entry Barrier 
The harsh eligibility criteria and long application procedures have created an entry barrier to 
Hong Kong’s public housing.  To be eligible for PRH, one has to be a permanent resident of 
Hong Kong and meet the prevailing income and total net asset limits.  For a family of 4, the 
total family income should not exceed $20,710 and the total net asset of the family should 
not exceed $436,000 as at 1 April 2013.24  Such criteria bar many citizens who do have 
genuine need from their access to public housing.  Under the high property price in the 
private market, a family of 4 earning slightly more than $20,710 a month is unlikely to be 
able to afford renting a private property, not to say purchasing one.  Yet they cannot pass the 
threshold for submitting an application.  Even a citizen fulfills the eligibility criteria for PRH, 
he would still have to go through a long process of filling in an application form, getting 
registered on the waiting list and attending a vetting interview before being given an offer 
eventually.  Such process is long, complicated and deterring.  
 
Long Waiting Time 
The long waiting time from application for public housing to offer of a PRH flat creates 
another barrier to accessibility. Since the nature of public housing requires immediate 
consumption, the long waiting time is detrimental to the daily lives of applicants and many of 
them are forced to cram into subdivided flats and cage homes in the private market.  The 
targeted waiting time for applicants on the PRH waiting list until being allocated with a PRH 
flat currently remains at the level of 3 years.  Although 3 years itself is already a long time 
for the desperate living with the poor conditions of cage homes and subdivided flats, it seems 
the government could not shorten the waiting time as it has already lagged behind from the 
target in most cases.   A common live case to quote is that a Hong Kong resident registered 
on the PRH waiting list in 2007 and is still waiting for his family’s turn to be offered a PRH 
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flat.  He is currently living with his family in their subdivided flat in Kwun Tong.  Obviously, 
they are only one of the many whose access to public housing is seriously hindered by the 
long queuing time. 
 
Despite the acute demand for shortening of the PRH waiting time, Mr Michael Choi Ngai-
min, member of the Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee, commented that it 
would be difficult to shorten the 3-year target and recommended to maintain the current 
target.  In fact, given the long PRH waiting list exceeding 228,400 applicants and the lead 
time of the construction of new PRH flats as announced in the 2013 policy address, the 
waiting time would inevitably remain long and it would continue to be a barrier to the 
accessibility to public housing in Hong Kong. 
 
Mismatch of Needs 
Mismatching between the geographical location of public housing and what is desired by the 
public deters the public’s access to public housing as well.  With the most conveniently 
located land being occupied for luxury private housing development (e.g. location in the 
vicinity of public transport infrastructure such as MTR), due to the limit of PRH locations, 
many PRH estates have to be built in the less accessible part of Hong Kong territories.  While 
the tenants would mostly be earning their living in the urban area, PRH in the more remote 
areas would effectively increase everyday travelling time as well as financial burden on 
travelling costs.  In the 2013 policy address, the Chief Executive pledged that another site in 
Sha Tau Kok would be allocated for rental housing development.25  Obviously, Sha Tau Kok 
is a very inaccessible location for the grassroots who need to commute between their remote 
homes and urban areas for work.  Such mismatching causes many PRH applicants to decline 
their offer and to keep on waiting for another offer.  Some of them even give up the PRH 
allocations but resort to the sub-divided flats in urban areas. 
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Incrementalist Housing Policies and Accessibility of PRH 
 
Limited Supply 
The limited supply of new housing units of PRH as compared to the demand of Hong Kong 
families forms accessibility barrier.  As the Chief Executive C.Y. Leung stated in the 2013 
Policy Address, in recent years, Hong Kong’s urban development has taken a disturbing turn.  
All too often, there are wrangles over land use and infrastructure projects, leading to sluggish 
land development and housing shortage.26  Supply shortage is the crux of the prevailing 
housing problem. In the past 5 years, on average only about 15,000 PRH flats were 
completed each year and the figure for HOS flats was zero.27  Although the government has 
speeded up the pace of building more PRH flats and targeted to provide a total supply of 
PRH of at least 100,000 units over the 5 years starting from 2018,28  actual construction takes 
time and the supply will increase only after a few years.  As commented by HO Hei-wah, 
Chairman of the Society for Community Organization, the increase in supply as pledged in 
the 2013 Policy Address was only a baby step and was still insufficient to meet the actual 
demand of people.  On one hand, the small change in the supply makes it difficult in locating 
suitable site for building PRH estates and on the other hand, the government is cautious in 
regularising the supply of subsidised housing in order to adjust the accessibility issue without 
taking bold steps for fear of a deep fall of property price. 
 
Lack of Master Planning  
Public housing policy requires master planning with reference to the city’s demographic 
structure, town planning, land supply, and etc.  The Hong Kong government approach to 
address the housing problem has long been on an ad-hoc basis instead of conducting master 
planning.  If there is call for more supply from the society, the government will simply look 
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at the housing figures without investigating the structural and systemic issues of the housing 
sector and market holistically.  The lack of master planning for instance, in the Donald 
Tsang’s term has resulted in the supply of PRH failing to meet the demand of the society.  
The complete halt in HOS has significantly decreased the recovery rate of PRH flats and put 
much more pressure on the demand of new PRH flats.  To this end, the current government 
has set up the Long Term Housing Strategy Steering Committee to set housing targets for 
long term planning and maintenance of consistent supply with reference to population 
projection, structure, demand for housing, land demand from the industrial and commercial 
sectors.   
 
Policies with Unintended Outcomes 
In fact, the Hong Kong government has been putting a lot of efforts of devising a long list of 
housing policies through different housing bodies in order to solve the housing problem of 
the low income group since the first introduction of the public housing policy in 1950s.  With 
the growth of the economy, many PRH tenants are in fact financially capable of buying their 
own homes but choose to continue to live in PRH units.  In order to incentivise the well-off 
PRH tenants to buy their own homes and move away from their PRH units, the government 
has since 1986 introduced the policy of charging double rents for rich tenants.29  Soon after 
the handover in 1997, the then Chief Executive Mr. C. H. Tung intended to increase the 
home ownership of Hong Kong people up to 70% and introduced the Tenants Purchase 
Scheme (TPS) in 1998 which enabled PRH tenants to buy their flats.  The policies of 
charging double rents for well-off tenants and selling public rental housing to the tenants, 
from a different perspective, have a direct impact on turning public housing from toll goods 
to private goods.  As the two measures have actually made the tenants to permanently live in 
their existing housing units, public housing is then turned into both excludable and rivalrous.  
The double-rent policy in 1986 pushed the idea to the extreme that tenants who were no 
longer qualified for public housing could retain the property by paying a higher rent.  This 
policy has fundamentally reversed the government position to encourage rich tenant to leave 
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their PRH flats.  It can be regarded as a measure tolerating the ineffective and mismatch of 
use of resources once the tenants are willing to pay for more.  Those who have an acute 
public housing need may have to wait for a longer period because of the policy 
implementation.   
 
Bureaucracy 
To obtain land for the construction of new PRH flats, the government could resort to either 
the development of new land, reclamation or urban renewal. The first two options involve 
cooperation and coordination between various government bureaux and departments such as 
the Lands Department and the Planning Department.  Since every single bureau or 
department has its own agenda and focus of work, it is difficult for them to work 
collaboratively and reach consensus.  Government departments often work on the 
conventional practice and procedures in dealing with the urgent need of housing shortage 
without regard to a strategic approach to tackle the thorny issues.   This often leads to long 
lag time in land development and affect the public’s accessibility to public housing.  Hong 
Kong lacks a unified government body to focus resources to coordinate the development of 
land and the building of public housing.  That is why considerable time and resources are 
spent due to the bureaucracy of various government bureaux and departments.   
 
Lack of Enforcement Action Against Abuse 
The Hong Kong Housing Department has been slow in combating the misuse of PRH units.  
Out of the 7,000 recovered PRH units annually, only 400 units were involved in violation of 
regulations.30  There have been widespread phenomenon that some of the well-off tenants 
have moved out from their PRH flats which are left unattended or involved in illegal 
transactions without surrender to the Housing Authority.  In addition, there have been a 
number of detected cases of PRH tenants subletting their flats in the past years.  Recently, 
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there was a case of a tenant in Leung King Estate in Tuen Mun subletting the rooms in his 
PRH flat for $2,000 a month.  Many other PRH tenants follow suit and even place subletting 
advertisements of their PRH flats on the Internet.  Obviously the government did not step up 
the enforcement action against the abuse, which would send a wrong message to the public 
drawing up more actual case of abuse of public resources.   As a result, the accessibility of 
PRH will be undermined by the inaction of the government.  
 
Collective Action and Accessibility of Public Housing 
The supply of housing units as a goods and service in Hong Kong is mostly determined by 
the government provision and private market whereas the behaviour of consumers can affect 
a great deal of the demand.  Unlike private goods, supply and demand curves draw up the 
price upon which a goods is sold.  In the case of public rental housing which is a toll goods, 
the supply and demand only exert a great effect on the accessibility of the goods such that 
crowding out will occur when demand exceeds the supply.  The collective action of a group 
suggests that the behaviour of each rational member of a group interact among themselves in 
order to serve their own self-interests, leading to irrational group performance or inefficient 
allocation of resources.  In accordance with the famous notion of “Logic of Collective 
Action” advanced by Mancur Olson, “even if all of the individuals in a large group are 
rational and self-interested, and would gain if, as a group, they acted to achieve their 
common interest or objective, they will still not voluntarily act to achieve that common or 
group interest.”31  We will examine how the individuals react with each other as well as in 
response to the government policies and action, influencing the accessibility of public 
housing in Hong Kong. 
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Housing Ladder 
There are a number of types of housing in Hong Kong including private ownership, private 
rental, subsidised ownership and public rental, the last of which is the focus of our study.  
According to the figures provided by the Hong Kong Housing Authority, there was 29.1% 
population living in public rental housing and 17.1% in subsidised home ownership housing 
in 201132, representing over 46% of Hong Kong people are living in “public housing”.  
Based on the notion of “Housing Ladder” suggested by Ho and Wong, the public rental 
housing tenants are in the best position to save sufficient capital to buy more expensive and 
better homes to move upward along the housing ladder.  For example, tenants in public rental 
housing enjoy a low rent and therefore a large portion of their monthly income can be saved 
for buying a Home Ownership units or a private property.  This is particular the case in Hong 
Kong from 1970s’ onwards when public rental tenants have worked hard to sponsor better 
education for their children who have in return buy flats to improve the living standard of 
their families, moving upward to become home owners from their previous status of public 
rental tenants.  The purchasing power of public housing tenants was observed to be 
significant in 1990s’.  As cited in the study of Ho and Wong, “An official survey by the 
Hong Kong Housing Authority showed that in 1992-1993 as much as 24 per cent of housing 
transactions were due to the public housing tenants and as much as 13 per cent to public 
housing tenants owned one or more homes.”33  As a virtuous cycle, the tenants at the bottom 
of the ladder gradually move up to the top of it, leaving more vacant units for allocation to 
those who are on the waiting list of the public housing.  Under the mechanism of the housing 
ladder, the public rental housing is considered as a starting point for people to live as a 
temporary home and provide a fertile ground for them to accumulate enough savings for 
climbing towards the higher end of the housing ladder. 
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Ripple Effect of Difficulty in Home Ownership 
Public housing is a scarce resource involving a great deal of capital investment and land 
resource.  The number of PRH flats has become a great financial burden on the government 
expenditures and therefore cannot be increased substantially.  As at June 2012, there were 
728,000 PRH units in Hong Kong.  Without taking into account the land price, the average 
cost for building a PRH unit is around HKD$400,000 and meanwhile the average monthly 
maintenance and management costs are around $1,000.  The heavily subsidised nature is 
financially not sustainable.34  If the proposal of increasing the number of PRH is not feasible, 
as aforesaid, the housing ladder played an important role in the accessibility of public 
housing in Hong Kong as the existing tenants have chance to move upward to buy their own 
properties, leaving more vacant flats to the new comers.  Whether the public housing tenants 
can move away from their rental units towards home ownership depends much on their 
access to the property market.  Due to the decreasing number of yearly output of new private 
residential units built over the past few years following the failed attempt of producing a 
yearly target of 85,000 new housing units announced in 2003, the property market has been 
overheated by limited supply, the influx of overseas capital and low interest rate.  The 
property price in Hong Kong has exceeded the affordability of average Hong Kong people, 
like the middle class group.  In recent years, due to the skyrocketing property prices in Hong 
Kong, people were barred from entering into the home ownership market, making them 
remain in the original level of the housing ladder and thus the mobility of people has become 
less.   In this way, the demand for public housing will only exponentially exceed the supply, 
making the public rental housing more inaccessible. 
 
Better PRH, Less Incentivised to Leave  
The early construction of public housing was mainly of primitive design and provided 
minimal facilities to residents due to limited societal resources and shorter lead time to meet 
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the growing needs for rehousing squatters affected by clearance.   The standard allocation of 
space in the first generation of public estates in 1970s was around 35 square feet per adult, 
compared with the current level of 70 square feet per adult,35 indicating that there has been a 
double increase of living space over 4 decades.  Because of the overcrowding situation in the 
early public housing, tenants have more incentive to move out from their units once they 
have accumulated sufficient down payment to buy their own flats either through HOS or 
directly in the private markets.  The building quality of the contemporary public estate in 
Hong Kong has significantly improved.  Not only does the size of the PRH flat has 
significantly increased, the town planning, design, layout and facilities of the PRH flats are 
also more comparable to HOS flats.  Nowadays, the PRH estates are all connected with 
easily accessible markets, shopping centres, restaurants, children playgrounds, transport 
infrastructure and community service.  During the frozen period of sale of HOS flats, some 
of the built HOS flats were even converted into PRH flats in order to meet the growing 
demand for PRH and to minimise the financial burden on maintenance of vacant flats.   As 
the PRH is so much better than before, the existing tenants had less incentive to buy the HOS 
flats or private properties in order to improve their standard of living.  If they leave the PRH 
flats and buy their own homes, their disposable incomes will be less than before, which may 
lower their standard of living at other facets.   In this way PRH tenants prefer to stay in PRH 
flats, turning the public rental housing as their permanent homes. 
 
Sitting Tenants 
The pulling force of remaining in the public housing has been growing intensively by the 
improved living condition in public housing as well as the changing social culture in Hong 
Kong.  Nowadays, young people seek a greater degree of personal space and try to live apart 
from their parents in order to gain more freedom.  The size of households in Hong Kong is 
growing smaller and smaller.  According to the government statistics, the average domestic 
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household size as at May 2013 stood at 2.9, dropping from 3.4 in 1991 and further to 3.1 in 
2001.36   There is a widespread phenomenon in the public housing in Hong Kong that most of 
the sitting tenants are elderly whereas their children moved out by themselves or started their 
own families after marrying.  As earlier discussed, the private flats are growing more and 
more expensive.  Young couples are only capable of buying small flats for themselves and 
therefore they tend to live apart from their old parents.  The parents are actually happy with 
this arrangement as they can enjoy more private living space and the fact that they remain in 
PRH flats can serve as a back-up home for their children in case of economic downturn.  
Another group of sitting tenants is those well-off households whose incomes exceeded the 
subsidy limit and they are charged with double rents.  Even by paying the higher rents, the 
tenants still enjoy a much lower living costs than home ownership as their disposable income 
will become much less if they finance their homes through mortgage repayment.   In 
response to the double rent policy, some sitting tenants even apply for splitting their 
household from their high-earning children in order to circumvent the compliance of paying 
higher rent.37   In order to evade from the enforcement of abusing public housing, the sitting 
tenants will not honestly declare their change of personal circumstances and continue to 
occupy their existing housing units.  Without moving out to vacate the flats for other 
applicants on the waiting list, sitting tenants have effectively changed the nature of PRH 
from toll goods to private goods. 
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New Demand 
Over the recent years, a new group of applicants, for example, university students emerge as 
the applicants on the waiting list of PRH.  Owing to the skyrocketing price of private 
properties that has become out of reach for most young people, a lot of them apply for PRH 
on their own as a single person once they reach 18 years of age, even though they do not 
have the imminent need.  The recent figures show that among the 228,400 applicants on the 
waiting list, 111,500 are non-elderly singles, of which 60,300 are aged 30.  There are more 
than 20,000 students on the waiting list in 2012.38 In fact, the university students apply for 
PRH because they foresee that they cannot afford buying private property upon their 
graduation and they want to join the waiting list as early as possible.  Some of them even 
consider that they do not want to earn extra money so as to maintain their eligibility for PRH.  
Their net disposal income will be higher if they stay in PRH than buying or renting private 
property.  Young people, especially who attain higher education qualification have a far 
greater potential for earning higher income than the middle-aged singles.  Priority should be 
given to the middle-aged as their earning power will be less than the fresh graduates.  As a 
result, the accessibility of PRH is greatly undermined because those who are supposed not to 
be the potential applicants have increased the demand for PRH, competing for the limited 
supply. 
 
Crowding out Access to Public Housing  
It is clear from the above paragraphs that the government lacks a long-term policy on public 
rental housing and does little to ensure that the public housing tenants can move upward 
along the housing ladder so that they can leave the pubic rental housing as long as they are 
financially capable.  Nonetheless, because of the limited supply of both HOS and private flats, 
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the individuals are stuck in the middle of pipeline, crowding out other desperate people on 
the waiting list from access to the public housing.  The government should advocate that the 
public rental housing is a transitional stage towards the ultimate goal of home ownership and 
increase supply so that the individual can respond to it by moving out.  At present, the sitting 
tenants have effectively turned toll goods into private goods by permanently living in a 
public housing unit.  The individuals are rational and self-interested to maximise their own 
benefits by acting in response to the economic situation and government policies and actions.   
  
Social Stigma and Community Rejection 
In Hong Kong, public housing has a negative social image and this forms hurdles for 
building more public housing. There is a stereotype that public housing is associated with 
grassroots, poor hygiene condition and various social problems.  It is generally believed in 
Hong Kong that a community having a large proportion of public housing estates is 
considered low-end and the price of the private property in that community would be 
adversely affected.  This poses a strong barrier to the public for gaining access to public 
housing.  The “Not In My Backyard” idea is still prevalent and most people do not wish the 
government to build PRH near to their homes.39   
 
For example, a site designated for building PRH in 2006 was opposed by the Kowloon City 
District Council and it was finally resolved in 2012 that the land would be used for the 
construction of HOS flats.  According to the record, a questionnaire survey conducted by the 
Kowloon City district councilors shows that over 90% of PRH tenants in the district oppose 
to the construction of PRH flats on that site.  Their reasons include worries and doubts on the 
suitability of building high-rise buildings, ventilation, and etc.  The plot of land was thus left 
vacant for so many years while a large number of applicants on the PRH waiting list still had 
to wait year after year.  It is indeed a challenge for the government to balance various vested 
interests and more importantly to sweep away the social stigma associated with public 
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housing.  Whenever there is a consultation of a plan to build PRH flats in a district, the 
landlords would oppose to any PRH construction plan in their communities as the proximity 
to PRH may drive down their property price or level of rent.  Once a person has acquired a 
private property in Hong Kong, he would attempt to protect his property value by guarding 
the land around his property, preventing any action which might affect the price.  This further 
affects the accessibility of Hong Kong’s public housing. 
 
Concluding Comments 
With limited land and housing resources, the cost of housing in Hong Kong is very high that 
the low income group cannot meet their housing needs in the private market.  The Hong 
Kong government cannot provide all the people with public housing as a personal entitlement 
but acts as an income distributor to allocate substantial societal resources in public housing to 
the neediest people.  It is criticised that there are too many barriers to the access of the public 
housing for example, the current eligibility criteria of the residency requirement or the harsh 
income limit, the unduly long waiting time, and mismatch of locations of PRH where tenants 
need to commute between their place of residence and urban area for work. 
 
In order to ensure social equity of assisting the underprivileged to get their basic housing 
needs within scarce public resources, applying eligibility criteria to the toll goods like public 
housing in Hong Kong is considered as one of the simplest and effective means to exclude 
other non-target group from access to it.   Under the current mechanism, there are already too 
many eligible people for the PRH and hence the waiting list for PRH has risen to an 
unprecedented high level.  Relaxing the eligibility criteria will increase the number of 
eligible applicants, making the waiting list for PRH even longer and the neediest people will 
have to wait for even longer time in order to access to PRH.  This would exacerbate the 
crowding out problem of accessibility to PRH.   
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The accessibility to PRH is determined by two factors: the supply and demand of PRH.  The 
supply of PRH has been hindered by the government’s incrementalist approach in delivery of 
public housing.   Whether the production of public housing can be significantly increased to 
meet the demand of those on waiting list is of paramount importance.  The government 
appears not to be able to increase the supply of PRH within a short span of time owing to the 
complicated structure of housing market in Hong Kong which involves a number of vested 
interests of property developers, the property owners and people who wish to buy one.  
Learning through the lessons from C.H. Tung’s target of building 85,000 housing units 
annually, the government would not run the risk of taking bold steps to increase the supply of 
PRH.  Also due to lack of master planning on land use and technical difficulty in zoning, 
what the government can do at present is to maintain a steady level of supply of PRH.  
Against the background of not directly increasing the supply by building more PRH flats, the 
government can only tried to incentivise existing tenants to leave PRH through the 
implementation of double rent policy and TPS.  Nevertheless, the people responded to the 
government policies in an unexpected and undesirable way, leading to the problem of 
collective action.  Because of the skyrocketing price of private property and the immobility 
of housing ladder, the sitting tenants exhausted all means in order to remain permanently in 
PRH, making it more excludable and rivalrous.  On the other hand, the new demand for PRH 
emerges from those who want to advance their chance of accessibility to PRH until it is too 
late like the university students applying for PRH once they reach 18 years of age.  As such, 
the accessibility to PRH is greatly hindered by the crowding out effect.   
 
In the next chapter, the public housing policies in Singapore will be examined to see how 
Hong Kong can take forward the Singapore experience in its future housing policies.  A few 
recommendations are drawn on some relevant key features of Singapore’s successful public 
housing experience. 
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Chapter Five    Conclusions and Recommendations 
 
Conclusions 
In the midst of the current political environment, public housing policy, which exerts a strong 
effect on the livelihood of the low income groups, has become a political war of words among 
citizens, stakeholders, social groups, legislators and government officials.  The northeast new 
town development has recently created a great political turmoil involving interests of existing 
inhabitants, environmental groups, farmers, property developers and even personal interests of 
officials.  Without fixing the problem of accessibility to public housing of the needy who cannot 
afford renting or buying private flats, the controversy will continue.  At present, there are at least 
171,000 people living in undesirable sub-divided flats exposed to high risks of fire.  The 
unprecedentedly long waiting list for PRH of around 228,400 applicants as at March 2013 also 
indicates that the public housing in Hong Kong is far from sufficient for the needy.   
 
At the outset of the study, the analysis of the nature of goods and services of public housing 
assisted us in understanding how the government can deliver goods and services effectively in 
order to incentivise the individuals to react in compliance with the policy target.  Public housing 
is a toll goods where it is possible to restrict someone’s access to it and it is available for 
subsequent consumption or use by someone else.  Therefore, in order to ensure that the PRH is 
readily accessible by qualified users, it is important to limit the eligibility criteria so that a 
designated group of people who are justified to access to the scarce public housing resources. 
One of the most effective ways is to devise measures to encourage sitting tenants not to turn their 
PRH flats from toll goods into private goods, because by doing so will deny the accessibility of 
others.  The government adopted an incrementalist approach to take effect of the gradual changes 
in housing policy for enhancing the accessibility.  For example, the policies of charging double 
rents for well-off sitting tenants and selling PRH flats to them for incentivising them to buy their 
own flats and ultimately leave their PRH flats as they could trade more expensive homes along 
the housing ladder.  The individuals respond to this policy in a different way because they 
regarded themselves to be entitled to what they have paid for.  As a result, they remain in the 
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PRH units and crowd out other users from accessing PRH.  The collective action problem of the 
individuals has effectively generated more demand for PRH instead of providing more recovered 
flats to increase the supply.   
 
Recommendations for Hong Kong’s Future Housing Policy Drawing on Singapore’s 
Experience 
Having analysed the government policy actions and collective action problem of individuals in 
the area of accessibility of PRH in Hong Kong, the discussion now turns to Singapore’s 
successful public housing experience from which Hong Kong could learn some lessons in terms 
of future policy and action. 
 
Like Hong Kong, Singapore started its public housing efforts 55 years ago from humble and 
challenging beginnings.  Singapore was once regarded as one of the worst ghettos in the world in 
1940s, but nowadays Singapore has achieved world leadership position when it comes to 
providing public housing 40 and Singapore’s public housing policy has been widely viewed as a 
showcase of the benevolent rule by the governing party, the People’s Action Party (PAP).  In 
Singapore, public housing has improved the overall attractiveness of the urban environment, 
making Singapore the de facto public housing labs of the world.41  
 
Overall it is not appropriate for Hong Kong to follow exactly what Singapore has done in public 
housing, the main reasons being: (i) the effective land utilisation in Singapore is much higher 
than Hong Kong’s – landscape in Singapore is quite flat and Hong Kong mountainous; and (ii) 
the Singapore government is much stronger than Hong Kong’s.  For example, Singapore has, 
under uninterrupted leadership by the PAP, been continuously undergoing reclamation without 
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opposition from the local environmental protection movement.42  Nevertheless, a number of key 
features of Singapore’s successful public housing experience are relevant and useful for Hong 
Kong, and the following recommendations are drawn from such key features aimed at improving 
the accessibility of PRH in Hong Kong in the future. 
 
Unified Public Housing Agency 
It is imperative that the Hong Kong government strengthens its policy development and 
implementation effectiveness by establishing a strong, unified, cohesive and integrated housing 
body through streamlining and simplifying its numerous agencies and public organisations 
concerned with public housing and related policy matters.  There are indeed a large number of 
such groups involved in the public housing policy process including but not limited to the 
Transport and Housing Bureau, the Hong Kong Housing Authority, the Housing Department, the 
Hong Kong Housing Society, the Urban Renewal Authority, the Development Bureau, the Long-
term Housing Strategy Steering Committee, the Town Planning Board, the Land Department, 
and Heung Yee Kuk.  This has led to disarticulated and inconsistent housing policy and long-
term planning. 
  
Public housing in Hong Kong should be better coordinated, delivered and made accessible by a 
lead agency similar to Singapore’s Housing and Development Board (HDB) which has been 
functioning very well (since the founding of Singapore in 1959) under the political leadership of 
the Ministry for National Development (MND) and the PAP.  Through the HDB/MND system, 
Singapore has integrated public housing with promoting strong family ties, sustainable 
development, and the national pension scheme.  Residents of HDB flats see themselves as proud 
citizens, satisfied owners and stakeholders of Singapore fully aligned with the fate of the 
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nation.43  The multiple agencies situation in Hong Kong could reduce public housing policy to 
only targets on paper and not concrete achievements delivered.44  
 
Such re-enginnering and re-organising of Hong Kong’s public housing agencies could also help 
reduce the regulatory costs of development in Hong Kong which are viewed as higher than those 
in Singapore.  According to a housing scholar, the difference between housing price and 
construction cost on average has been enlarged by 67% due to regulatory-related delays.  Thus, 
high housing price levels in Hong Kong have not been really caused by land shortage but by the 
above-mentioned high regulatory costs of development, noting that the percentage of land 
developed in Singapore is over 90% versus 25% in Hong Kong.45  In Hong Kong, public housing 
on average takes 7 years to construct and this is mainly due to the tedious and complex interplays 
among a multitude of government agencies46.   This long lead time has hindered the accessibility 
of PRH. 
 
Strategic Approach to Housing Policy 
Historically, the public housing policy of the Hong Kong government has been ad hoc first then 
“incremental” and not as visionary as that of Singapore where the PAP, and the nation’s founder, 
Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, right from the start (in 1959 – when he and the PAP won the election and 
came into power) saw public housing as a means for land reform and for gaining citizens’ loyalty 
and support for nation building.47 Hong Kong started with a laissez faire approach in housing 
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policy and then evolved from acting ad hoc to incrementalism with the government remaining in 
control of the public housing allocation process, whereas Singapore took a strategic and socialist 
approach right from the start but then quickly developed effective market mechanisms for public 
housing. 
 
It is recommended that after the first 60 years of providing public housing, the Hong Kong 
government take a Singapore-style strategic approach (as opposed to incrementalism) to 
formulating and executing public housing policy and integrate it with a number of the relevant 
areas like public transport, schools, healthcare, community development, the Mandatory 
Provident Fund (MPF) and population policy to improve the accessibility of public housing. 48   
In fact, Hong Kong should learn from Singapore’s strategic-all-encompassing, integrated value-
chain approach which has been successfully applied to not only public housing policy but also 
other policy areas and various industry sectors including aviation, bearing in mind that Hong 
Kong has significantly lagged behind in this regard,49 even if it is no longer a British colony 
practicing incrementalism. 
 
Fairness in Public Housing Allocation and Market Mechanism 
Another successful experience of Singapore’s public housing policy is it emphasis on a fair 
distribution of resources to citizens advocated by a capable and strong government which is 
trusted by citizens, compared with the Hong Kong government’s track record in setting standards 
for allocating public housing units to the public has been messy.50 In Singapore, owners of HDB 
flats, thanks to government policy, have no difficulties in acquiring home ownership and also 
enjoy the benefits of effective market mechanisms for both sale and rental transactions - a HDB 
flat owner can also rent out part of or his/her entire flat, thereby enabling the public housing 
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market to develop freely.51  “Collective action” among Hong Kong’s PRH tenants unwilling and 
unable to move for fear of lossing their benefits can be easily contrasted with Singapore’s HDB 
flat residents most of whom opt for home ownership rather than tenancy believing that the 
former is more beneficial for them.52  In fact, even recently more HDB flat owners were “holding 
on to their properties, even after the expiration of the minimum occupancy period” and “resale 
HDB flats were hotcakes in the property market”. 
 
Hong Kong could thus well consider improvements along similar lines towards developing 
effective market mechanisms for public housing sale or rental, thereby improving the 
accessibility of PRH.  “Trapped tenants” of PRH could then be “liberated” and thus have better 
accessibility to public housing.  In order to avoid potential speculative excesses, Hong Kong 
could consider some of Singapore’s good measures such as: (i) only citizens can buy HDB flats; 
(ii) landed immigrants with permanent residency can buy resale HDB flats’ (iii) generally HDB 
flat-owners can only sell their flats after living in them for at least 5 years’ (iv) a family can own 
only one HDB flat at any one time’ and (v) restrictions are imposed on singles wishing to buy 
HDB flats – only starting from July 2013 can singles aged 35 or older and earning not more than 
S$5,000 a month buy HDB flats. 
 
Affordable Public Housing Ownership 
Half of the households in Hong Kong are home owners whereas the other half has become 
disadvantaged due to the continuing rise of housing price levels, thus causing an increasing 
resentment and anxiety from the non-owners who believe the government collaborates and 
colludes with property developers in order to generate handsome amount of revenue from land 
sale.  The Hong Kong government should consider taking some minor administrative measures 
that could turn these non-owners (PRH, HOS and TPS) into real owners (at least 80% of the 
Hong Kong population), thereby yielding major improvements in social equity and transaction 
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costs.53 In this way, Hong Kong could also avoid having a divisive community torn between 
home-owners and non-owners, and regain past confidence, unity and stability.54 In particular, 
PRH residents could thus avoid being trapped for life as tenants, and the flat sale price levels 
should be reasonable and affordable.  Another lesson from Singapore’s experience is that HDB 
flats enabled the majority of Singaporeans to enjoy home ownership and to become stakeholders 
of the economy who can benefit from an increasingly wealthy nation.55 In Hong Kong, home 
ownership is not just for accommodation, but for most families a major source of savings and a 
means for social upward mobility, and as such, home ownership has critical cross-generational 
impact on families.56  
 
Tenants of PRH should thus be assisted with acquiring home ownership with more flexible 
financing schemes including the enabling of such tenants to withdraw savings from their MPF 
accounts to make down payment in purchasing subsidised public housing flats, and Singapore 
offers a good model - HDB flats are effectively a much better version of Hong Kong’s HOS. 
HDB flats are government-built and sold to eligible Singaporeans at heavily-subsidised price 
levels,57 and a key policy objective has consistently been to ensure that every Singaporean can 
afford it.  For example, a family is eligible with even only two members and with not more than 
S$8,000 of monthly income and starting from 1968, Singaporeans have been able to buy HDB 
flats with their money in the national pension scheme, the Central Provident Fund (CPF).  In 
Hong Kong, currently PRH tenants have no property right and occupants of HOS and TPS need 
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to make a large land price payment before becoming true home owners, thereby having no 
prospects for ownership as land price levels continue to rise.58  
 
 Public Housing Quality and Living Space 
The high quality of HDB flats is a worthwhile target for Hong Kong to strive for achievement, 
making public housing more attractive and accessible.  HDB has been very innovative with 
continuing efforts in building design and development.  For example, studio apartments for the 
aging population, monetization options for flat owners, subsidised building upgrades and the 
provision of broadband communications network facilities and overall quality.59  As early as the 
1970s, over 20 designs were made available to build HDB flats, then in the 1990s, private-sector 
architects were started to be invited to participate in the design of new HDB projects. 
 
The living space in Hong Kong’s public housing is limited and therefore improvement in this 
regard is recommended with reference to Singapore’s hard-to-beat benchmark.  Many HDB flats 
are over 1,000 sf whereas Hong Kong’s average size per occupant is only 150 sf which is 
equivalent to half of Singapore’s 60 and large families can have even 4-bedroom HDB flats61 - 
much better than Hong Kong’s PRH which at one point was referred to as just “units of 
accommodation” and not “flats”.62 
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 Land Supply for Public Housing 
Finally, the key to improving PRH accessibility in Hong Kong is enabling more land supply.  
Though reclamation projects are not welcome by the public and environmental group, without 
better option, reclamation is recommended as a pragmatic solution towards this end.   Since over 
100 years ago reclamation has been the most cost-effective way to increase government land 
supply in Hong Kong, and has generally not been resisted by the people including the 
environmental protection movement which is mainly concerned about the Victoria Harbour and 
green parkland.  The government could thus consider reclamation in the outlying islands areas 
despite the fact that it lost confidence and momentum because of a court decision in recent years 
ruling against further reclamation in the Victoria Harbour, and perhaps relocating container 
terminals in Kwai Chung and Tsing Yi to other locations to release more land for housing.63  
Such a restart of the reclamation works should be initiated as early as possible because it takes an 
average of at least 8-10 years to complete the full process from reclamation of land to 
construction of public housing units.64 Singapore has reclaimed 6,000 hectares of land whereas 
Hong Kong only 2,000 hectares.65  Singapore’s experience and success track record in land 
administration and inventory management is useful for Hong Kong66 on practically increasing 
the land supply.  A good example is Singapore’s Marina Bay reclamation program in the 1970s 
which provided an inventory of land for the subsequent successful development of the Gardens 
by the Bay project.67  
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Concluding Comments 
By 2012, 29.1% of Hong Kong’s population lived in PRH but the demand for more PRH units 
had become increasingly acute due to the continuing rise of property price levels, a shortage of 
land supply, and a low production/supply level of PRH flats (the current yearly average number 
of PRH flats is only 15,000 which will be increased to 20,000 only from 2018 onwards, and the 
yearly number of recovered PRH flats is only 7,000).  As at March 2013, the waiting list for 
PRH in Hong Kong has reached a record level of 228,400 people of which around 49% are non-
elderly singles who are not covered by the government’s latest pledge to provide more PRH units.  
Furthermore, around 171,000 people are still living in sub-divided flats in old buildings and at 
least half of them are on the waiting list for PRH.  The demand for PRH thus far exceeds the 
supply and it appears that those in need have had great difficulties in accessing public housing in 
Hong Kong. 
 
The Hong Kong government has, over the past 60 years either under the British rule or the 
governance of the SAR government, solved public housing problems at various stages on an ad 
hoc basis, without a thorough long-term systematic plan, and then incrementalism rather than a 
strategic approach.  The Hong Kong government has been muddling through in the light of the 
property market dynamics, the land supply limitation, the economic situation and the demand 
from the people of Hong Kong.  On the other hand, the general public tries to interpret the Hong 
Kong government’s policies and acts appropriately to maximise their benefits from the property 
market, and such collective actions have affected accessibility to PRH.  Overall, the government 
has put economic growth on a higher priority than helping the poor and the needy. 
 
As the contemporary problem of the accessibility to PRH is gaining force and the waiting list for 
PRH is growing longer than ever before, it is recommended that the Hong Kong government take 
a strategic approach to public housing policy in order to improve accessibility.  For 
benchmarking and inspiration towards developing useful recommendations for Hong Kong’s 
future policies, Singapore is a good source of ideas because the country has achieved a world-
leading track record in providing quality and affordable public housing to a majority of its people 
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and therefore accessibility to public housing is no longer a problem at all.  Until today Singapore 
is still very strategic, innovative and effective in terms of public housing policy development and 
implementation.   
 
Drawing from some relevant key features of Singapore’s successful public housing experience, it 
is suggested that the Hong Kong government consider the following points for future policies 
and action: (i) unify public housing policy coordination, implementation and accountability 
through a lead agency similar to Singapore’s HDB/MND, (ii) take a strategic approach to public 
housing policy and fully integrate it with other relevant policy areas, (iii) ensure fairness in 
public housing allocation and develop market mechanisms for public housing, (iv) provide 
affordable public housing, and (v) increase land supply for public housing through faster and 
better reclamation, land administration and inventory management measures. 
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